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Income and Asset Declaration systems can be a power-
ful tool to prevent corruption and detect the theft of
public assets....We should never forget the reason we
create these systems. As part of an overall anti-corrup-
tion strategy, they help ensure that scarce resources are
spent honestly and wisely. In this way, we help citizens
get the health care, the education, the roads and the
quality of life they have paid for and deserve. And...this
attention to good governance acts as a reinforcing foun-
dation for prosperity and stability. – Otaviano Canuto,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Net-
work Vice President
Financial disclosures are quickly becoming one of a number
of important tools for anticorruption agencies and govern-
ments to use in fighting corruption. The genesis of such re-
quirements was an effort to address concerns by citizens about
the honesty of civil servants and politicians. By the middle of
the 20th century, many of the more developed democratic
countries had some form of disclosure requirements for public
officials; however, the laws and rules were widely varied.
Moreover, a broader body of empirical research has begun
to suggest that well-functioning governance institutions con-
tribute in an important way to economic growth. Gover-
nance, as understood in this context, refers to the “essential
parts of a broad cluster of institutions” (Acemoglu 2008, p.
1) and encompasses the methods that officials employ in pol-
icy making and delivery of goods and services (World Bank
2007). The focus on accountability as a means of improving
those processes stems from a belief that establishing the un-
derlying institutional arrangements of accountability (that is,
rules of the game) and strengthening organizational capacity
Financial declarations or income and asset disclosures (IADs) are quickly becoming an important tool for
anticorruption agencies and governments to fight corruption. IAD systems can play two important roles within a
broader framework of good governance: prevention and enforcement. In an effort to discover how best to design and
implement an IAD system, the analysis conducted suggests that countries ultimately must design a system that best
complements the environment in which it will function. However, there are several key principles that policy makers
and practitioners need to consider: limit the number of filers to improve the odds of success, set modest and
achievable expectations, provide resources commensurate with the mandate, prioritize verification procedures to
align with available resources, and balance privacy concerns with public access to declarations.to achieve mandates will lead to better governance perform-
ance and, by implication, to greater economic growth.
Despite the prominence of governance and anticorruption
in the development agenda1 and the tremendous progress
that has been made in measuring governance outcomes in
combating corruption,2 far less effort has been made to un-
derstand the specific policies and institutions that contribute
to the control of corruption. Recent experience suggests that
intervention in inefficient or ineffective public sectors may
alleviate the misallocation of public funds. A new focus on
preventive and/or corrective action against illicit enrichment
practices is addressing the need to further support this agenda.
The misuse of funds at all levels of government leads to fail-
ures in economic development, no matter the cause.
Better evidence on the link between institutions and gov-
ernance will encourage efforts to instill a culture of integrity
in public service that shapes behaviors and perceptions of
good governance. Transparency and accountability practices
contribute to good governance both by explicitly defining
acceptable actions and by establishing an environment in
which public officials understand what is expected of them,
both from the system and from the citizens they serve. Eco-
nomic development policies will benefit from systems that
function in an environment of credible accountability prac-
tices and that shape the incentives of public officials through
prevention and enforcement. 
IAD systems can play two important roles within broader
good-governance efforts: prevention and enforcement. On
the prevention side (exemplified by systems in the United
States and countries of the European Union), IAD require-
ments can help bring to light conflict-of-interest risks faced
by public officials who file IAD forms, thereby facilitating
avoidance of situations that may lead to inadvertent (or in-
tentional) misuse of public resources. On the enforcement
side (exemplified by systems in places such as Hong Kong,
China;Macao, China; or Georgia), IAD requirements can
provide one more source of information for use when inves-
tigating and prosecuting suspected illicit enrichment cases,
thereby aiding asset recovery efforts. 
Recent empirical work on IAD policies and practices
highlights five key trade-offs that must be addressed, and it
suggests principles that should guide policy makers (as fur-
ther explained below). 
Key T rade-offs in Design and Implementation
of IAD Systems
There are several key considerations for policy makers and
practitioners building an effective IAD system and establish-
ing the credibility of the system with stakeholders. Discussed
below are some of the trade-offs that countries face in devel-
oping and implementing an IAD system in a given context.3
Limit the Number of Filers to Improve the 
Odds of Success
The number of individuals who are required to declare their
incomes and assets may compromise the effectiveness of an
IAD system, particularly if resources devoted to that system
are limited. Limiting coverage to positions most at risk of sig-
nificant conflicts of interest or illicit enrichment (such as pro-
curement officials who directly oversee spending decisions)
can provide an important option for ensuring both the effi-
cacy and the cost effectiveness of an IAD system. It is imper-
ative that governments craft an approach that takes into
account such trade-offs. This imperative applies both to pol-
icy makers who are creating an IAD system and to the public
servants who are responsible for implementing the system.
In the latter case, if available resources are particularly re-
stricted, it may be appropriate to focus on collecting decla-
rations from high-level officials or from positions with the
most conflict-of-interest risk or with the greatest access to
funds that could be stolen. 
It is important, however, to understand both the goals of
the system and the ability of the implementing agency (or
agencies) to meet those goals. Although limiting the number
of filers may be an effective way to ensure their declarations
are appropriately overseen, there may be other avenues avail-
able to ensure proper implementation and monitoring—such
as electronic filing and electronic verification of the content
of the declarations, as the experience of Argentina suggests.  
Set Modest and Achievable Expectations
Realistic expectations concerning the outcomes of an IAD
system can significantly improve the system’s credibility with
stakeholders, thereby enhancing the odds of success. The fail-
ure of IAD systems to live up to expectations, particularly if
swift and comprehensive outcomes were promised, can ruin
the sustainability of reform efforts. For this reason, it is of
fundamental importance that expected outcomes be achiev-
able. Examples of ways to address this challenge include lim-
iting the number of filers, setting realistic time frames for
achieving clear milestones, and not promising to significantly
reduce corruption and successfully prosecute corruption
cases with the IAD system alone. An IAD system is only one
of many tools that can be used in the effort to detect and dis-
courage corrupt activity. These systems are best considered
in conjunction with other mechanisms for encouraging the
accountability of public officials.
Provide Resources Commensurate with the Mandate
Without adequate resources, even the best-designed IAD sys-
tem functions poorly. Not only should an IAD unit’s budget
remain independent from those of other entities, provide for
adequate resources to support the system, and ensure conti-
nuity of funding; but the unit itself must have properly
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ability to monitor the system. 
What is typical in practice is modest or little financial sup-
port for IAD implementation. In many cases, this is sympto-
matic of broader budgetary constraints for the government.
In the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, several staff have ex-
pressed concern that financing from the budget is not ade-
quate for the number of declarations received. 
Beyond mere monetary resources, it is also important to
consider the staffing needs relative to the number of decla-
rations to be collected or analyzed. For instance, Mongolia’s
anticorruption agency has a dedicated staff of 10 people who
are directly responsible for the declarations of the 256 high-
est-ranking public officials (a 1:25 ratio); however, they are
ultimately responsible for a total of 52,000 declarations (a
1:5,200 ratio) submitted each year. These numbers can be
analyzed in comparison with those of Kyrgyzstan, which has
a staff of 4 people responsible for 17,000 declarations (a
1:4,250 ratio); Argentina, where a staff of 12 is responsible
for 34,000 declarations (1:2,833); and Croatia, where a staff
of as many as 27 people manage 1,800 declarations (1:66).
As these numbers suggest, the ratio of personnel to declara-
tions can vary wildly among countries, and it doesn’t neces-
sarily correlate directly with “success” for the system. The key
issue is what these staff are expected to do with the declara-
tions, and whether those responsibilities are commensurate
with the number of declarations being received. 
Argentina has tried to institute an electronic verification
system for the declarations, easing the demands on individual
staff. Mongolia has decided to focus resources on the decla-
rations of the top 256 officials there, while devolving some
responsibilities for the remaining declarations to ethics offi-
cials within individual government agencies. Other countries,
recognizing the staffing shortages they may face, have chosen
to concentrate on submission compliance rather than on ver-
ifying the accuracy of the declarations. These are significant
trade-offs that must be considered when designing and im-
plementing a system. 
Prioritize Verification Procedures to Align with 
Available Resources
A well-designed IAD system requires timely review of the con-
tent of declarations by a qualified and impartial official. With-
out monitoring and verifying the data in declarations, the
process of filling out declarations can easily become a mere for-
mality. However, verifying the accuracy of declarations is one
of the hardest parameters to implement. As a consequence, it
is wise to take a multitiered approach to verification, beginning
with the first tier and encompassing the succeeding tiers as re-
sources and authority permit. These are the suggested tiers:
• Tier 1: Simple checks for both completeness and consis-
tency of the information contained in submissions. Irreg-
ularities or inconsistencies within a single IAD form or
in IAD forms over time can alert an experienced re-
viewer to potential breaches of ethical or legal behavior,
particularly if the law allows reviewers to follow up and
seek clarification or corroboration. If resources prevent
undertaking these simple checks for all declarations,
simple checks on a high-risk subset or a random subset
of the declarations can provide significant benefits at a
fraction of the cost. 
• Tier 2: Cross-checking data with other sources of related
information.A careful cross-checking review can reveal
discrepancies between asset declarations and other
sources—such as property registries, tax declarations,
and other databases. To be effective, the IAD agency
needs to have the authority and the capacity to conduct
such checks, and the information from external sources
needs to be available and reliable.
• Tier 3: Computerized pattern recognition checks. Elec-
tronic IAD review systems equipped with data-mining
software enable implementing agencies to conduct ran-
dom and risk-targeted verifications of asset declarations
and to “red-flag” patterns or irregularities that might
escape the notice of even the most diligent reviewers.
Electronic submission and verification procedures thus
can significantly enhance the effectiveness of IAD sys-
tems by enabling reviewers to select and prioritize spe-
cific risk categories.
All three of these verification tiers can be facilitated by
establishing user-friendly submission systems that ensure in-
formation is provided in a consistent format (making it easier
to review). In countries with technological capabilities, cap-
turing returns in electronic form can automate completeness
and consistency checks. Such uniform formatting and elec-
tronic filing can reduce both delays caused by incomplete or
incorrect declarations and content verification costs. How-
ever, in determining whether such a system is appropriate, it
is important to consider both the initial costs of implement-
ing the system and the long-run costs of maintaining, run-
ning, and updating such equipment. 
Balance Privacy Concerns with Public Access to
Declarations
Even in countries where an IAD system is acknowledged as
a powerful tool to prevent conflicts of interest and to detect
possible corruption, the tension between granting public ac-
cess to asset disclosure information and an official’s right to
(or concerns about privacy) often emerges as a controversial
issue. Although citizen privacy is accepted in some countries
as a fundamental individual right, privacy rights may hinder
the effectiveness of some disclosure systems—particularly
those that lack rigorous verification procedures and thus de-
pend all the more on public scrutiny for effective enforce-
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against illicit enrichment are weak or unreliable. In an at-
tempt to resolve the debate between public availability and
privacy, some experts suggest that a distinction be made be-
tween different categories of information contained in a fi-
nancial disclosure, thus allowing public access only to a subset
of that information—namely, that information deemed not
to compromise privacy rights or personal security. (See box
2 for country-specific examples.)
Snapshots of IAD Implementation
As mentioned at the beginning of this note, countries should
ultimately design an IAD system that best complements the
environment in which it will function. Below are some snap-
shots from a selected number of country examples, reflect-
ing different approaches from the perspective of both their
legal framework and their choice of implementation ap-
proach.
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Box 1. The Limits of Good Practice
Whereas most countries with an asset declaration system
apply many of the “good-practice” elements of an IAD legal
framework, here are some notable findings from a sample of
74 countries:
• Only 11 percent of countries with an IAD framework
require free provision of declaration content.
• Fully 40 percent of countries fail to specify a location
at which declaration content may be accessed.
• Fully 82 percent of countries fail to specify how long
IAD records must be maintained. 
• Whereas nearly 60 percent of countries identify an
agency tasked with verifying or reviewing declarations,
no more than 30 percent of countries specify explicit
criteria in the legislation for this responsibility.
The descriptive statistics here are using data and indicators
that can be found on the recently launched World Bank data
portal. (For more information, see the PAM-AGI Web site pro-
vided in the source note to this box.) The portal is a powerful
tool to explore consolidated data and indicators on gover-
nance in several countries across the world, including the IAD
legal frameworks in 87 countries.
Source: Public Accountability Mechanisms (PAM) Initiative, Income and Asset Disclosure legislative indicator dataset, 2009:
https://www.agidata.info/pam.
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System
Since its passage in 1999, the IAD system for Argentina’s ex-
ecutive branch has achieved significant success in filing com-
pliance and implementation. The system was designed to
enable content accuracy verification of declarations from the
most senior 5 percent of public officials, and to provide a sys-
tematic and targeted audit of the remaining 95 percent of of-
ficials on the basis of risk. These categories of risk include
declarations that demonstrate significant changes in asset val-
ues over time (revealed through electronic data mining) and
employees of certain ministries where the risk of engaging in
corruption is higher (for example, taxation or custom agency
employees). 
Although  challenges  of  enforcing  sanctions  remain—
largely because of bottlenecks in the court system—some of
Argentina’s procedures may represent good practice. The
country’s experience is also a good example of (1) an IAD
system whose procedures have been adjusted and honed over
time through learning by doing, (2) a strong framework for
coordination between the verification of declarations and the
investigation functions of the broader anticorruption agenda,
and (3) the power to conduct investigations into underlying
acts of corruption in which asset declarations may play an
important part. 
Macao, China: Protecting Files and Filers
Notwithstanding the advent in some jurisdictions of online
submission of declaration forms, income and asset declaration
systems typically produce very large amounts of paper doc-
uments. The forms are legally required to be kept confiden-
tial at all times. There are strict provisions protecting the
integrity of the data contained in these files. In many coun-
tries, forms should be (but rarely are) kept for several years.
Moreover, storage capacity of asset declarations remains a
problem for many countries. The risk of destruction or theft
requires the same sorts of risk mitigation measures, regardless
of whether the data are stored in hard-copy or electronic
form. The specifics of each measure, however, will differ be-
tween paper and electronic systems. For example, the system
in Macao, China, mitigates against this risk by producing
forms that contain carbon copies that are stored in a secure
facility. There is currently an initiative to have copies stored
in a separate building to guard against loss through fire or
natural disaster. 
Mongolia: Good Practices in a Nascent IAD System
Mongolia’s experience is a good example of gradual imple-
mentation of an IAD system in its early stages. A 2006 law
created the Independent Agency Against Corruption (IAAC),
which is responsible for managing the IAD program. Enter-
ing its fourth year of existence, the IAAC has achieved sig-
nificant progress in relatively little time, reporting a 99.9
percent submission compliance rate. Despite its success on
this front, the agency has faced some challenges regarding re-
sources and obtaining cooperation from outside agencies and
banks. 
The IAAC, although granted authority to verify any dec-
laration at its discretion, is specifically required to analyze
the declarations of officials who are the subject of an official
complaint. Despite having the authority to audit other dec-
larations, the agency reports that it has chosen only to audit
declarations if an official complaint is made —a choice made
in an effort to ensure that its audits do not appear to be po-
litically motivated. This is an example of an anticorruption
agency taking the country’s political circumstances into ac-
count when determining policy, attempting to establish its
credibility as a nonpartisan and fully independent agency.
However, such a strategy may not always be advisable be-
cause official complaints could prove politically motivated.
A preferable approach is where the agency is able to imple-
ment random or fisk-based audits that are believed by the
public to be honest and impartial. Because Mongolia’s cur-
rent approach is not a particularly systematic approach to
risk-based targeting, it is a good idea to complement such re-
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Box 2.  The Issue of IAD Forms Confidentiality in Selected
Economies
Guatemala’s Probity Law ensures complete confidentiality of
asset disclosures, except by court order. This ban extends to
government entities, including the Prosecutor’s Office. Given
the limits this places on the use of the declarations, it might
be preferable to improve interagency cooperation for the pur-
pose of criminal investigations, rather than to ban access to
declarations.
Similarly, the IAD system in Macao, China, remains com-
pletely confidential. However, declaration information has
been used successfully to prosecute corrupt officials charged
with illegal enrichment, and so it may contribute to public
faith in the system. It is important to note, however, that this
system has achieved its level of success in an environment
characterized by a strong rule of law.
On the other side of the spectrum, Hong Kong, China; Kyr-
gyzstan; and Mongolia use a tiered public access model,
granting access according to the seniority of the declaring of-
ficial. Mongolia, in particular, requires investigations of any
official’s asset declaration if an allegation of inaccuracies on
the declaration is lodged against the official by any member
of the public.quirements with a systematic targeting of verifications—even
if the systematic algorithm is simply a random sample of all
filings. 
Notes
1. See, for example, World Bank (1997, 2000, 2004,
2006a,b).
2. See, for example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2006); and TI (2003, 2005, 2006). 
3. For more details on the individual trade-offs and their
overall role and impact on IAD systems, see Burdescu et al.
(2009).
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